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Abstract. In this paper we present and confront the main comparative static results - effects 
of labor supply, demand and institutional wage movements - of the (a) basic two-sector 
model in six different scenarios: free market; partial (one-sector) coverage with perfect 
intersector mobility; partial (one-sector) coverage with imperfect mobility (Harris-Todaro); 
multiple (two-sector) coverage with imperfect mobility (Bhagwati-Hamada); partial (one-
sector) coverage with affiliation restrictions in the covered sector; partial (one-sector) 
coverage with limited employment generation ability in the traditional uncovered sector. 
Keywords. Migration, Mobility, Minimum Wages, Segmented Labor Markets, Regional 
Labor Markets. 
JEL. O15, O18, R23, J42, J61, J62, F22. 
 
1. Introduction 
his paper affiliates to the Todaro (1969) and Harris-Todaro (1970) model of 
a dualistic economy
i
. This model has had several applications in labor, 
international and development economics; it sheds light on issues as 
migration - international or rural-urban labor flows-, inter-sector mobility, dualistic 
and segmented (labor) markets
ii
, and even implications of minimum wage
iii
 laws 
with partial coverage. The principle has had wide applications in issues concerning 
regional economics, and even in subjects such as language choice
iv
. International 
economics literature
v
 dealt with the problems of welfare implications and optimal 
policies to achieve efficiency.  
The aim of this research is to distinguish the three scenarios that have been 
advanced in the literature and allow for two other frameworks – the latter being the 
free market bench market solution and the existence of labor force restrictions in 
one of the sectors. The scenarios are reduced to a common and simple algebraic 
format, allowing us to proceed to the derivation and comparison of several 
comparative static results.  
Firstly, we distinguish perfect from no (short-run) mobility across the two 
regions or sectors in models with only one covered sector by the institutional wage 
rules. Secondly, we allow for institutional arrangements to force wage 
determination in both of the sectors or regions. In this setting, adjustments are 
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forced through supply
vi
 – these arrangements may be found in Bhagwati and 
Hamada (1974).  
Finally, we use the two versions of the model with unemployment and introduce 
size restrictions in one of the sectors. On the one hand, we allow for the possibility 
of covered sector's affiliation to be restricted; the reasons for such an occurrence 
may rest with "insider-outsider" arguments, with urban congestion, or even 
existence of migration quotas. On the other, we consider the possibility of a limited 
employment (and output) generation ability of the secondary (traditional) region or 
sector; in this scenario, there will also be "rural" unemployment. 
The approach followed is essentially valid for long or medium-run assessment. 
We ignore inputs other than labor that may affect economic outcomes - wage bill 
effects are, thus, indistinguishable from total output effects. Labor may be seen as 
homogeneous and we interpret the two sectors as regions; or we may interpret that 
there are two types of labor - as in Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) - that (can or) 
cannot immediately switch from one sector to the other. We ignore search issues
vii
.  
In each particular framework, we establish the basic hypothesis, and analyze 
changes in the labor market implied by: 
- change in the institutional wage(s) 
- sector/region or global demand fluctuations
viii
 
- alterations in total labor supply - always considered inelastic. 
and compare the effects in the different scenarios. 
A distinction is made between the impact on absolute and relative measures of 
unemployment: total or global unemployment, total unemployment rate and local 
or sector unemployment rates. 
We focus on issues that are relevant for labor (and regional) economics and 
business cycle analysis rather than for international trade. The research results may 
be applicable to interpret local problems or in small countries for which output 
demand is perfectly elastic - output price is exogenous. 
We depart from the benchmark case - free market with perfect mobility across 
regions or sectors -, outlined in section II. In section III, partial coverage with 
perfect mobility - i.e., people not employed in the primary sector can immediately 
get a job in the secondary sector and wait there for an opportunity to switch, and 
thus, there is no unemployment generation - is introduced. In section IV, a version 
of the Harris-Todaro model - with imperfect mobility and institutionally fixed 
wage in one of the sectors - is presented. In section V, the Bhagwati-Hamada 
economy is forwarded; comparative statics are analyzed for two cases: multiple 
coverage (wage is set institutionally in both sectors or regions but may differ from 
sector to sector) and total or complete coverage (wage is equal in both sectors). 
Section VI deals with frameworks where there are size restrictions: in the primary 
sector size - the counterpart of the H.-T. model; and in the employment generation 
capacity of the secondary sector - the "dual" case of the B.-H. model. Section VII 
provides the comparison of the exogenous demand or supply shocks on some main 
macroeconomic aggregates across the four standard dualistic scenarios. The 
exposition ends with a brief summary in section VIII. 
 
2. Dualistic Scenario - Free Market Solution 
2.1. The Model 
In this section, we exposit the basic dualistic scenario, common to most 
dualistic models, and highlight the general free market outcome and the essential 
comparative statics results within that model that may interest labor economists 
and migration/mobility and business cycle analysts.  
Consider the following scenario: 
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1. There are two sectors in the economy with specific local/industry labor 
demands which determine local or sector employment, L
i
: 
L
i
 = L
i
(W
i
) , i = 1, 2      (II.1) 
or in inverse form 
W
i
 = W
i
(L
i
) , i = 1, 2      (II.2) 
which depend negatively on the wage paid to local or industry employees. 
There are no cross effects, i.e., L
i
/W
j
 = 0 for ij. Capital and trade are ignored: 
both regions produce an homogeneous good with distinct technologies and no 
capital. 
L
i
(W
i
)' is the slope of the demand in sector i; W
i
(L
i
)' is, of course, its inverse – 
both usually assumed negative. We will denote the elasticity of demand in sector i 
i
 = L
i
(W
i
)' W
i
 / L
i
(W
i
) = W
i
(L
i
) /[W
i
(L
i
)' L
i
]. As is well-known, at an 
i
 | > 1, a rise in the wage decreases the wage bill and vice-
versa: a large number of the conclusions in dualistic frameworks will depend on 
which is the case, others on relative size of demand elasticities in the two sectors. 
2. Total supply is perfectly inelastic and fixed or exogenous, L
_
. People affiliate 
to (or locate in) either of the sectors, with: 
L
_
  =  L
_
1
 +  L
_
2 
      (II.3) 
3. Individuals are risk neutral and maximize expected income. 
These three assumptions are common to most of the dualistic models. The free 
market outcome will arise if also: 
4. Wage in first sector is determined by market conditions, i.e., L
1
 = L
_
1
. 
5. Wage in second sector is determined by market conditions, i.e., L
2
 = L
_
2
. 
6. Job rotation is completely free, i.e., individuals in one sector can costlessly 
and immediately switch to an employment in the other sector. 
Then,  
L
_
i
 = L
i
 = L
i
(W
i
)  ,   i = 1,2      (II.4) 
The equilibrium in dualistic models results from individuals' maximizing 
expected wage. In the present scenario, people will move from one to the other 
sector's employment till equalization of wages. That is, wage W will adjust till W* 
that solves: 
L
1
(W*) + L
2
(W*)  =  L
_
      (II.5) 
In Fig. 1 we depicted the equilibrium solution; in the graph, of horizontal size L
_
, 
demands are depicted with respect to each of the vertical axis where the wages 
corresponding to each of the sectors are read. 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 1(2), A. P. Martins. p.150-185. 
153 
153 
0
0
W
1
W
2
L (W  )
1
1 L (W )
2
2
W*
W*
L (W  )
1
L (W )
2 **
Fig. 1
 
In equilibrium, there will be no unemployment; the average wage in the 
economy, (W
1
 L
1
+ W
2
 L
2
) / L
_
, and the expected wage in each region,W
i
 L
i
 / L
_
i
, 
i = 1,2, are equal to W*. 
 
2.2. Comparative Statics: Change in Labor Supply 
Consider a change in L
_
. We get that, from (II.5): 
W*/ L
_
  =  1 / [L
1
(W*)' + L
2
(W*)']  <  0    (II.6) 
The wage will decrease to accommodate employment of new labor supply, 
which will be distributed between the two sectors. The increase in employment will 
be larger in the region where the slope of the demand, L
i
(W*)', is larger in absolute 
value.  
The wage bill in either sector will increase iff elasticity of demand in that sector 
is larger than 1 in absolute value. The total wage bill will increase iff: 
L
1 1
) +  L
2 2
)  <  0     (II.7) 
 
2.3. Comparative Statics: Shift in Labor Demands 
1. Take a change in labor demand that does not alter the slope - a parallel shift 
outwards of the demand in one of the sectors, say sector 1. Let, then, demand in 
sector 1 be represented by L
1
 = L
1
(W
1
) + a, or, alternatively, W
1
 = W
1
(L
1
 - a), 
where a is the shift parameter 
ix
. Then (II.5) becomes: 
L
1
(W*) + a + L
2
(W*)  =  L
_
      (II.8) 
A positive change in a will imply an increase in the equilibrium wage: 
W*/ a = - 1 / [L
1
(W*)' + L
2
(W*)']  > 0     (II.9) 
Employment will decrease with a in region 2 (where labor demand does not 
shift, being negatively sloped); consequently, it will increase in region 1, once L
_
 is 
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fixed. Thus, the wage bill will always increase in region 1. It will increase in region 
2 iff elasticity of demand in that sector is smaller than 1 in absolute value. Total 
wage bill will always increase, because total employment is, after all, fixed (equal 
to L
_
) and W* rises. 
2. Consider a general increase in demand. That is, let demand in sector i be 
represented by L
i
(W
i
) + c, or W
i
 = W
i
(L
i
 - c), i = 1,2, and consider changes in c, 
which affect both sectors simultaneously. Then, the equilibrium condition 
becomes: 
L
1
(W*) + 2 c + L
2
(W*)  =  L
_
      (II.10) 
 
A rise in c will imply an increase in the equilibrium wage: 
W*/ c  =  - 2 / [L
1
(W*)' + L
2
(W*)']  >  0     (II.11) 
 
Again, total wage bill will always increase, because total employment is equal 
to L
_
 and W* rises with c. 
Employment in region i will move according to: 
[L
i
(W*) + c] /c = [L
j
(W*)' - L
i
(W*)'] / [L
1
(W*)' + L
2
(W*)']  (II.12)   
Consequently, employment will increase in (population will move towards) the 
region of lower demand slope in absolute value. The wage bill in region i will 
move according to: 
{W* [L
i
(W*) + c]} / c =      (II.13) 
= - {2  [L
i
(W*) + c] + W* [L
i
(W*)' - L
j
(W*)']} / [L
1
(W*)' + L
2
(W*)']  
Wage bill in region i will increase iff  
[L
i i
)  > [L
j j
     (II.14) 
This will occur provided that 
L
i
(W*)' > L
j
(W*)'       (II.15) 
The demand slope is higher in absolute value in sector j; or (another sufficient 
but not necessary condition) that the elasticity of demand in sector i is lower than 2 
in absolute value. 
Summarizing: 
 
Proposition 1:  
1.1. Under free market, the usual dualistic model will result in equalization of 
wages across regions or sectors and there will be no unemployment. 
1.2. An increase in exogenous labor supply will: 
- decrease the equilibrium wage to accommodate the new total supply 
- increase the wage bill in a sector iff elasticity of demand in that sector is larger 
than 1 (in absolute value). 
1.3. An increase of either or both demands will always increase the equilibrium 
wage and the total wage bill. 
1.4. If the (outward) demand shift is unilateral, it will rise the wage bill in the 
sector where it occurred. Employment will decrease in the other sector. 
1.5. If we have a general (outward) demand increase, employment will rise in 
the region of lower demand slope (in absolute value). 
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3. Partial Coverage - The Perfect Mobility Case 
3.1. The Model 
Consider we maintain assumptions 1. to 3. of section II and: 
4. Wage in one of the sectors, sector 1, is institutionally determined. 
5. Wage in second sector is determined by market conditions, i.e., L
2
 =  L
_
2
. 
6. People in one sector can immediately get a job in the second sector. 
Then 
L
2
 =  L
_
 - L
1
(W
1
)       (III.1) 
If a person does not get a job in the first sector, where he can get the higher 
wage W
1
, he can immediately go to the second sector, where he can wait for an 
eventual sector 1 job offer at the same time he works. Therefore, equilibrium will 
yield: 
L
1
(W
1
) + L
2
(W
2
)  =  L
_
       (III.2) 
or 
W
2
[L
_
 - L
1
(W
1
)]  =  W
2
      (III.3)  
Graphically, we can see the result in Fig. 2: the wage in the second sector will 
absorb all the supply not employed in the first sector. 
Notice that 
W
1
  >  W*  >  W
2
        (III.4) 
otherwise minimum wage is not binding. That is, W
1
 must be higher than the 
competitive wage W*; the wage in the other sector, W
2
, will decrease to 
accommodate all excess demand generated in the first sector. 
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In equilibrium, the expected wage in each region, W
i
 L
i
 / L
_
i
, i = 1,2, is always 
equal to W
i
. 
3.2. Comparative Statics: Change in Covered Sector Wage. 
Consider a change in the institutional wage. In this environment: 
W
2
 / W
1
 = - L
1
(W
1
)' / L
2
(W
2
)' <  0    (III.5) 
Then, an increase in W
1
 will imply: 
- a decrease in 1's employment 
- an increase in 2's employment and a fall in W
2
 
- 
1
 is smaller than 1 in absolute value. 
- 
2
 is larger than 1 in absolute value. 
- an increase in total wage bill iff 
W
1
 
1 1
 < W
2
 
2 2
     (III.6) 
 
3.3. Comparative Statics: Change in Labor Supply 
An increase in L
_
 will be absorbed in sector 2, with no particular innovation with 
respect to its consequences relative to a one-sector standard model. Employment in 
the second sector will increase and W
2
 will decrease. The wage bill will increase 
iff the elasticity of demand in the second sector is larger than 1 in absolute value. 
The average wage in the economy will decrease with supply: 
[(W
1
 L
1
+ W
2
 L
2
) / L
_
] /L
_
 =  [L
_
 L
2 
/ L
2
' - (W
1
 - W
2
) L
1
] / L
_
2
 <  0 (III.7) 
 
3.4. Comparative Statics: Shift in Labor Demands 
The consequences of a shift in demand(s) has opposite effects on W
2
 to a 
similar change in L
_
, once we can write the equilibrium solution as: 
L
1
(W
1
) + a + L
2
(W
2
) + b =  L
_
     (III.8) 
or 
W
2
[L
_
 - a - b - L
1
(W
1
)]  =  W
2 
     (III.9) 
Therefore, W
2
 always increases with either a or b. The wage bill in either case 
moves according to the change we are considering: 
1. b = 0. Then, we have a change in the institutional sector demand. Consider, 
thus, an increase in a. The wage bill in the first sector will rise. The wage bill in the 
second sector will rise iff elasticity of demand in that sector is smaller than 1 in 
absolute value. Total wage bill will move according to: 
{W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
) + a] + W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)}/a =  W
1
 - 
2
) W
2
     (III.10) 
Therefore, it will increase with a iff: 
W
1
  >  (1 - 
2
 |) W
2
      (III.11) 
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This always occurs, once in the equilibrium solution W
1
 > W
2
 > (1-
2
|) W
2
. 
2. a = 0. Then, we have a change in the uncovered sector demand. Employment 
will not change in either sector. The wage bill in the first sector will stay constant. 
The wage bill in the second sector, and thus total wage bill, will always rise: 
{W
2
 [L
2
(W
2
) + b]}/b =  - W
2
[L
_
 - b - L
1
(W
1
)]' [L
2
(W
2
) + b] > 0 (III.12) 
3. a = b = c. Then, we have a general demand increase. The wage bill in the first 
sector will rise, as well as its employment. The wage bill in the second sector will 
move according to: 
{W
2
 [L
2
(W
2
) + c]}/c =       (III.13) 
 = - 2 W
2
[L
_
 - 2 c - L
1
(W
1
)]' [L
2
(W
2
) + c] - W
2
 = 
 = - W
2
 (
2
) =  - W
2
 (1  -  
2
 |)  
Therefore, it will increase with demand iff demand elasticity in the uncovered 
sector is smaller than 2 (in absolute value). Total wage bill will increase iff 
W
1
  >  W
2
 (1  -  
2
 |)       (III.14) 
This always occurs, once in the equilibrium solution W
1
 > W
2
 > (1-
2
|) W
2
. 
Summarizing: 
Proposition 2:  
2.1. In a dualistic model with perfect mobility and institutional wage fixed in 
one of the sectors, the equilibrium wage in the second sector is lower than the free 
market wage. There will be no unemployment. 
2.2. An increase in the institutional wage will: 
- decrease employment in the covered sector 
- increase employment and imply a fall in wage of the uncovered sector 
- increase the wage bill in the covered sector iff demand elasticity in that sector 
is smaller than 1 in absolute value. 
- increase the wage bill in the uncovered sector iff demand elasticity in that 
sector is larger than 1 in absolute value. 
2.3. An increase in total supply will  
- decrease the wage in the uncovered sector, where the additional supply is 
accommodated by local demand 
- increase the wage bill in the uncovered sector iff demand elasticity in that 
sector is larger than 1 in absolute value. 
2.4. An increase of either or both demands will always increase the equilibrium 
wage in the uncovered sector and the total wage bill. It will always rise the wage 
bill in the sector where the shift occurred. 
2.5. If the (outward) demand shift is unilateral, employment will decrease in the 
uncovered sector if the shift occurred in the covered sector. The employment 
distribution will not change if the shift occurred in the uncovered sector. 
2.6. If we have a general (outward) demand increase, employment of the 
covered sector will rise and the employment in the other will decrease. 
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4. Partial Coverage - The Harris-Todaro Model 
4.1. The Model 
In this section, we exposit the Harris-Todaro model and the essential 
comparative statics results within that model that may interest labor economists 
and migration/mobility and business cycle analysts.  
Let us start by the three previous assumptions of the dualistic context. In Harris-
Todaro, they are complemented by: 
4. Wage in one of the sectors, sector 1, is institutionally determined. 
5. Wage in the second sector is determined by market conditions, i.e., L
2
 = L
_
2
. 
6. Job rotation is only locally accomplished, i.e., individuals in one sector 
cannot get an employment in the other sector. 
Then  
L
_
2
 = L
2
 = L
2
(W
2
)       (IV.1) 
In region 2 there is no unemployment and expected wage is W
2
. In region 1, 
there is unemployment and expected wage is  
W
1
  x   Probability of Employment in region 1   (IV.2) 
Probability of employment in region 1 is 
L
1
(W
1
) / L
_
1
        (IV.3) 
As long as W
1
 x Probability of Employment in region 1 > W
2
, people flow to 
region 1. Therefore, employment will distribute among the two sectors or regions 
in such a way that, as long as W
1
 > W
2
: 
W
1
  x   Probability of Employment in region 1 = W
2
  (IV.4)  
That is, in the long run we expect that: 
W
1
 L
1
(W
1
) / L
_
1
  =  W
1
 {L
1
(W
1
) / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
)]}  =  W
2
   (IV.5) 
or
x
: 
W
1
  L
1
(W
1
)  =  W
2
 [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
)]  =  W
2
 L
_
 - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)    (IV.6) 
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Graphically - see Fig.3, where a box of base dimension L
_
 is depicted along with 
the two sector demands 
xi
 -, (IV.5) implies that wage in sector 2 will go down till 
the point where the area a equalizes the area below the covered sector wage, b. 
(IV.6) establishes that the area under W
2
*
 is equal to the equilibrium total wage bill, 
i.e., total wage bill will equal W
2
*
 L
_
. 
Equilibrium wage in the uncovered sector may be higher or lower than the 
competitive wage W*. 
In equilibrium, expected wage in each sector as well as average wage in the 
economy - due to (IV.6) - are equal to W
2
. 
 
4.2. Comparative Statics: Change in Covered Sector Wage 
1. Consider a change in wage in sector 1. Then 
W
2
 / W
1
 =  L
1
(W
1
1
) / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)']   (IV.7) 
1
 = L
1
(W
1
)' W
1
 / L
1
(W
1
) > -1, an increase in W
1
 will increase 
L
1
 W
1
. 
 
Proposition 3:  
3.1. Consider a dualistic model with no mobility. The equilibrium wage in the 
second sector may be higher or lower than the free market equilibrium, in which 
there will be unemployment in the institutional sector or urban region.  
3.2. If wage-elasticity of demand of the covered sector is smaller than 1 (in 
absolute value), that is, if an increase in the wage increases the wage bill in the 
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covered sector, a rise in the covered sector wage will also increase the wage in the 
uncovered sector.  
3.3. Therefore, if W
1
 is close to (but always larger than) the latter, the wage in 
the second sector will also be larger iff elasticity of demand in the covered sector is 
smaller than 1 in absolute value. 
The implications for the wage of the uncovered sector of a rise of the covered 
sector wage are derived geometrically in Corden and Findlay (1975:62). 
Consider the effect on the wage bill in sector 2: 
[L
2
(W
2
) W
2
] / W
1
 = {[L
2
(W
2
) W
2
] / W
2
} W
2
 / W
1
 =  (IV.8) 
  = L
2
(W
2
2
) (W
2
 / W
1
) = 
 = L
1
(W
1
) L
2
(W
2
1 2
) / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] 
As for total wage bill:  
[L
1
(W
1
) W
1
 + L
2
(W
2
) W
2
] / W
1
 =     (IV.9) 
 = L
_
 L
1
(W
1
1
) / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] = 
 = L
_
 W
2
 / W
1
  
(Last equality comes from looking at (IV.6)). 
Let us see what happens to unemployment. Within this framework, we may be 
interested in what happens to: 
- total unemployment, U = L
_
 - L
1
(W
1
) - L
2
(W
2
) 
- global unemployment rate, u = U / L
_
;  
- local or sector unemployment rate, u
1
 = U / [U + L
1
] = U / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
)]. 
Notice that u
1
 = 1 - Probability of Employment in region 1. 
Unemployment, U = L
_
 - L
1
(W
1
) - L
2
(W
2
) - and the unemployment rate, given 
that  L
_
 is fixed -, will vary with the wage in the covered sector in such a way that: 
U / W
1
 = - [L
1
(W
1
)' + L
2
(W
2
)' W
2
 / W
1
]  =   (IV.10) 
=- {(W
1
 - W
2
) L
1
(W
1
)' L
2
(W
2
)' + L
1
(W
1
)' [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
)] + L
2
(W
2
)' L
1
(W
1
)}/ 
/ [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] 
Even if W
2
 / W
1
 
1
 < -1, unemployment may still 
increase with the wage in the covered sector. If W
2
 / W
1
 > 0, unemployment 
will necessarily increase with W
1
. If W
2
 is close to W
1
, i.e., if W
1
 is close to free 
market wage, unemployment will increase with the institutional wage. 
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Let us consider what happens with the local unemployment rate, u
1
, in region 1. 
One can show that: 
{1 - L
1
(W
1
) / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
)]} / W
1
 = - L
1
 [(L
_
 - L
2 1
 + L
2
 
2
] / (IV.11) 
 / {W
1
 [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
)]} > 0 
 
Proposition 4: An increase in the wage of the covered sector will increase the  
4.1. wage bill in the uncovered sector iff either: 
- both labor demands have wage-elasticities smaller than one in absolute value 
or 
- both labor demands have wage-elasticities larger than one in absolute value. 
4.2. total wage bill iff wage-elasticity of demand of the covered sector is smaller 
than 1 (in absolute value). 
4.3. total unemployment (and total unemployment rate) if wage-elasticity of 
demand of the covered sector is smaller than 1 (in absolute value); or if W
2
 is close 
to W
1
 (i.e., around free market solution). 
4.4. local (sector) unemployment rate. 
 
4.3. Comparative Statics: Change in Labor Supply 
Consider a change in L
_
. We get that, from (IV.6): 
W
2
/ L
_
 = - W
2
 / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] <  0    (IV.12) 
Therefore employment in sector 2 increases. Total unemployment will increase: 
U/ L
_
 = 1 - L
2
/ L
_
 = 1 - L
2
(W
2
)' W
2
/ L
_
 =    (IV.13) 
 = [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
)] / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] > 0 
As for the global unemployment rate, u = U / L
_
: 
(U/L
_
) / L
_
 = [(L
_
 - L
2
) (L
1
 + L
2
) + W
2
 L
2
' (L
_
 - L
1
 - L
2
)] /   (IV.14) 
 [(L
_
 - L
2
 - W
2
 L
2
') L
_
2
] 
It will be positive iff: 
{L
_
 [(L
1
+ L
2
) / L
2
] - L
1
 - L
2
} / (L
_
 - L
1
 - L
2
) > - 
2
 
2
 |   (IV.15) 
 
The left hand-side of the expression is larger than 1. Therefore, even if  
| 
2
 | > 1, the global unemployment rate may still increase when L
_
 increases. If 
| 
2
 | < 1, the unemployment rate will necessarily increase with L
_
, once the 
inequality (IV.15) will always hold.  
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 1(2), A. P. Martins. p.150-185. 
162 
162 
Local unemployment rate, u
1
 = 1 - L
1
(W
1
) / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
)], will vary in the 
same direction as [ L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
)], and, because L
1
(W
1
) is fixed, as U does; 
therefore, it will increase with L
_
. (Alternatively, W
1
 is fixed and W
2
 decreases; so, 
the probability of employment in region 1 must decrease as L
_
 rises for equilibrium 
to hold.) 
Total wage bill will equal L
_
 W
2
. Therefore: 
(L
_
 W
2
)/  L
_
 = W
2
 + L
_
  W
2
/ L
_
       (IV.16) 
 =  - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
2
) / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] 
The wage bill will increase iff demand in sector 2 has absolute wage-elasticity 
larger than 1. As the average wage in the economy, [W
1
L
1
(W
1
)+W
2
L
2
(W
2
)]/ L
_
, 
will equal W
2
 in equilibrium, it will move in the same direction as the wage in the 
uncovered sector. 
 
Proposition 5: An increase in labor supply will decrease the wage in sector 2. It 
will increase total wage bill iff elasticity of demand in sector 2 is larger than 1 in 
absolute value. It will increase total unemployment and local unemployment rate in 
region 1; the global unemployment rate will increase if elasticity of demand of the 
uncovered sector is smaller than 1 (in absolute value).  
4.4. Comparative Statics: Shift in Labor Demands 
This section, in some instances, reproduces the findings of Corden and Findlay 
(1975) and McDonald and Solow (1985). These last authors analyze the effects of 
business cycle fluctuations on a segmented labor market economy with a primary 
sector where wage determination is subject to collective bargaining and a 
secondary competitive sector. Corden and Findlay (1975) also consider the subject 
of economic expansion without - the H.-T. framework - and in the presence of 
capital mobility between the two sectors. 
1. Take a change in labor demand that does not alter the slope - a parallel shift 
outwards of the demand in sector 1. Let, then, demand in sector 1 be represented by 
L
1
(W
1
)  + a, where a is the shift parameter
xii
. Then (IV.6) becomes: 
W
1
  [L
1
(W
1
)  + a] =  W
2
 L
_
 - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)    (IV.17) 
A change in a will imply a change in sector 2´s wage in the following way: 
W
2
/ a = W
1
 / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] > 0   (IV.18) 
Therefore employment in sector 2 decreases with a: some people leave sector or 
region 2 for the other where the positive shift occurred. Total unemployment, L
_
 - 
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(L
1
 + a) - L
2
 - and global unemployment rate - will likely decrease but by less than 
1's employment increases: 
[L
_
 - (L
1
 + a) - L
2
]/a = - {(W
1
 - W
2
) L
2
(W
2
)' + [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
)]} /  (IV.19) 
 / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)']  
This will be negative if W
1
 = W
2
, i.e., around the free market equilibrium; or if  
2
 |  <  [L
1
(W
1
) + a] / L
2
(W
2
)      (IV.20) 
but neither are necessary conditions. 
Given that W
2
 increases with a, and W
1
 is fixed, the probability of employment 
in sector or region 1 must rise with a in equilibrium - therefore, the local 
unemployment rate must decrease with a. 
The total wage bill will increase, once L
_
 W
2
/ a > 0. 
Notice that this occurs without any change in 1's wage. 
2. Consider a parametric change in demand of sector 2. Write it as L
2
(W
2
) + b, 
which means that (IV.6) becomes: 
W
1
 x L
1
(W
1
) =  W
2
 L
_
 - W
2
 [L
2
(W
2
) + b]    (IV.21) 
A change in b will imply a change in sector 2's wage in the following way: 
W
2
/ b = W
2
 / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - b - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] > 0   (IV.22) 
and 
(L
2
(W
2
) + b) / b = L
2
(W
2
)' W
2
/ b + 1 =   (IV.23) 
 = [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - b] / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - b - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] > 0 
The increase in 2's employment is smaller than the shift. In this case: 
[L
_
 - L
1
 - (L
2
(W
2
) + b)] / b = - (L
2
(W
2
) + b) / b  < 0  (IV.24) 
Global unemployment - and unemployment rate - decreases with b. As L
1
 is 
fixed, also local unemployment rate in region 1 will decrease with b. 
The total wage bill will increase, once L
_
 W
2
/ b > 0. 
3. Consider now a simultaneous shift in demand. We have the equilibrium 
condition: 
W
1
 x  [L
1
(W
1
) + c] =  W
2
 L
_
 - W
2
 [L
2
(W
2
) + c]   (IV.25) 
Then: 
W
2
/ c = (W
1
 + W
2
) / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - c - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)'] > 0   (IV.26) 
(L
2
(W
2
) + c) / c = L
2
(W
2
)' W
2
/ c + 1 =   (IV.27) 
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 = [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - c + W
1
 L
2
(W
2
)'] / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - c - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)']  
This will be positive iff: 
2
 |  < (L
1
(W
1
) + c) / (L
2
(W
2
) + c)    (IV.28) 
i.e., the elasticity of demand in the uncovered sector is smaller than the relative 
employment size of the other region's employment. 
The impact (L
2
(W
2
) + c) / c is smaller than 1 - because W
1
 L
2
(W
2
)' < -W
2
 
L
2
(W
2
)' -, the impact on 1's employment. This could be seen as reproducing the 
McDonald and Solow (1985) theoretical result, consistent with empirical evidence: 
over the business cycle, fluctuations of primary sector employment will be higher 
than those of the secondary sector. We also expect the total unemployment - and 
global unemployment rate - to decrease with c because: 
U/c  = - (L
2
(W
2
) + c) / c - 1 =     (IV.29) 
= - [2 (L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - c) + (W
1
 - W
2
) L
2
(W
2
)']/[ L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - c - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)']  
This will be negative if W
1
 = W
2
, i.e., around the unrestricted equilibrium; or if  
2
 |  <  2  (L
1
(W
1
) + c) / (L
2
(W
2
) + c)    (IV.30) 
but neither are necessary conditions. 
As W
2
 increases, because W
1
 is fixed, the probability of employment in sector 
1 must increase, and therefore the local unemployment rate in sector 1 will 
decrease with c. 
The total wage bill will increase. Wage bill in sector 2 will move according to: 
{W
2
 [L
2
(W
2
) + c]}/c =       (IV.31) 
= {W
2
 L
_
 + W
1
 [L
2
(W
2
) + c + W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)']} / [L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - c - W
2
 L
2
(W
2
)']  
This will be positive iff 
{L
_
  [L
1
(W
1
) + c]} / {[L
_
 - L
2
(W
2
) - c] [L
2
(W
2
2
 |  (IV.32) 
2
 | < 1, not a necessary condition. 
 
Proposition 6:  
6.1. An increase in the demand of either or both sectors will increase the wage 
of the uncovered sector and the total wage bill. It will likely decrease total 
unemployment; it will always decrease local unemployment rate in region 1.  
6.2. Response movements will be higher if the shift of one of the demands 
occurs in the covered sector. If the shift occurs only on the covered sector, it will 
have an anti-cyclic effect on employment of the uncovered sector. 
6.3. A general increase in demand will imply higher response movements in the 
employment of the covered sector. 
The implications for wage of the uncovered sector and unemployment rate in 
the covered sector of economic expansion working as a demand shift are derived 
geometrically in Corden and Findlay (1975:62). 
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5. Multiple and Global Coverage in the Presence of 
Mobility Costs - The Bhagwati-Hamada Model 
5.1. The Model 
In this section we want to quantify the effects of several changes in a two-sector 
model with institutional rules in both sectors. One can see this same (technically 
speaking) scenario in, for example, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). The authors 
model a two-sector economy where both sector wages are institutionally fixed - 
each sector is interpreted as employing individuals of different skills - and examine 
the issue of emigration (or immigration...) of skilled population out of (into) the 
economy. Instead, we focus on the internal migration of an equally skilled 
population - or mobility process between two sectors of people with "horizontally 
but not vertically" different skills - between two areas induced by several 
exogenous changes. Our interpretation would also apply to the consequences of 
those changes in the presence of integrated labor markets when there are high 
mobility costs. 
We distinguish two environments: 
- multiple coverage. By multiple coverage we mean that the wage is fixed 
institutionally in both sectors, but may differ from one sector to another. 
- total coverage. By total coverage we mean a model where the same wage 
applies to both sectors or regions.  
In a setting where wages are exogenously fixed, adjustments are made through 
labor supply movements.  
We consider the common assumptions 1. to 3., assumption 4. of the previous 
sector and:  
5. Wage in second sector is also institutionally determined. 
6. Job rotation is only locally accomplished, i.e., individuals in one sector 
cannot get an employment in the other sector. 
Then, employment, being demand determined: 
L
i
 =  L
i
(W
i
)        (V.1) 
Let U
i
 be the local unemployment in region i, i.e.: 
U
i
 = L
_
i
 - L
i
         (V.2) 
where L
i
 is employment in sector i and demand determined, i.e., L
i
 = L
i
(W
i
).  
Denote by u
i
 the unemployment rate in sector/region i. Define: 
u
i
 = U
i
 / L
_
i
 = 1 - L
i
 / L
_
i
        (V.3) 
Notice that these definitions are consistent with the ones of the previous section 
- just consider that U
2
 = 0 for the H.-T. case. One can see that the previous section 
results would apply in the case where the wage restriction is non-binding in one of 
the sectors - the lower wage one. 
Consider first the case of multiple coverage. The equilibrium condition will 
establish equalization of expected income in both sectors: 
(1 - u
1
) W
1
 = (1 - u
2
) W
2
       (V.4) 
that is, equilibrium is defined by: 
W
1
 L
1
(W
1
) / L
_
1
 = W
2
 L
2
(W
2
) / L
_
2
     (V.5) 
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and, of course, (II.3). Local unemployment rate will be higher in the region of 
higher wage. 
In equilibrium, the average wage in the economy, [W
1
 L
1
(W
1
) / L
_
1
] L
_
1
 / L
_
 + 
[W
2
 L
2
(W
2
) / L
_
2
] L
_
2
 / L
_
, is equal to the expected wage in each sector, W
i
 L
i
(W
i
) / 
L
_
i
. 
Graphically, areas c and d, the wage bills in each sector - Fig. 4 - are fixed; the 
population will be distributed in such a way as to equalize expected wages.  
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5.2. Comparative Statics: Change of the Sector Wage 
Take a change in the wage of sector/region 1. As usual the wage bill in this 
sector (and total wage-bill) will increase iff the wage-elasticity of demand is 
smaller than one (in absolute value). We have that: 
L
_
1
/W
1
 = -L
_
2
/W
1
 = L
_
2
 L
1
(W
1
1
)/[W
1
L
1
(W
1
)+W
2
L
2
(W
2
)] (V.6) 
This condition is stated in Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). 
Iff the wage elasticity of demand in sector 1 is smaller than one, then supply in 
sector 1 increases and in sector 2 decreases. As W
2
 L
2
(W
2
) is fixed, this also 
implies that equilibrium expected wage W
2
 L
2
(W
2
) / L
_
2
 = W
1
 L
1
(W
1
) / L
_
1
 will 
increase.  
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If such elasticity is smaller than 1, local unemployment in region 2 will decrease 
- because L
2
(W
2
) is fixed and L
_
2
 decreases. The local unemployment rate in 
region 1 will always increase: 
[L
1
(W
1
) / L
_
1
] / W
1
 = [L
1
(W
1
)´ W
1
 L
1
(W
1
) L
_
1
 -  L
_
2
 L
1
(W
1
)
2
] /        (V.7) 
 / {L
_
1
2
 [W
1
L
1
(W
1
)+W
2
L
2
(W
2
)]} < 0 
See, again, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). 
Local unemployment in region 1 will move according to: 
U
1
 /W
1
 = [L
_
1
 - L
1
(W
1
)] /W
1
 = L
_
1
 /W
1
 - L
1
(W
1
)' =  (V.8) 
 = {L
_
2
 L
1
(W
1
) - L
_
2
 L
1
(W
1
1
 
1
 | L
1
(W
1
) L
_
 [L
1
(W
1
)/ L
_
1
]} / 
 / [W
1 
L
1
(W
1
) + W
2 
L
2
(W
2
)] 
This will be positive iff: 
1
 |  {1  -  (L
_
 / L
_
2
) [L
1
(W
1
) / L
_
1
]}  <  1     (V.9) 
1
 | < 1 or: 
L
_
2
 / L
_
  <  L
1
(W
1
) / L
_
1 
      (V.10) 
 
Proposition 7: With multiple coverage, the increase in one sector's wage:  
- increases the wage bill 
- increases supply in that sector (and decreases the supply in the other sector) 
- increases the equilibrium expected wage iff the wage-elasticity of labor 
demand of the sector in which the wage increase was registered is smaller than 1 
(in absolute value). The reverse would happen if such elasticity was larger than 1. 
Total unemployment and the local unemployment rate in the region where the 
wage increase took place will necessarily increase. 
 
5.3. Comparative Statics: Change in Labor Supply 
Consider a change in L
_
. Wages and employment are fixed - therefore, also the 
wage bill. We get that 
xiii
: 
L
_
i
 / L
_
  = W
i
 L
i
(W
i
) / [W
1
L
1
(W
1
) + W
2
L
2
(W
2
)] > 0  (V.11) 
 
Proposition 8: An increase in total supply will be distributed between the two 
sectors proportionally to the corresponding share in the total wage bill. It will 
increase (all measures of) unemployment and decrease the expected equilibrium 
wage. 
 
5.4. Comparative Statics: Shift in Labor Demands 
1. The equilibrium condition (V.5) can be seen as: 
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W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
) + a] / L
_
1
 = W
2
 L
2
(W
2
) / L
_
2
     (V.12) 
Consider then a change in a. 
L
_
1
/a = - L
_
2
/ a = W
1
 L
_
2
 / {W
1
[L
1
(W
1
)+a] + W
2
L
2
(W
2
)} > 0  (V.13) 
We have symmetric effects in both sectors: with an increase in the demand of 
sector 1 there is a labor force shift from sector 2 to sector 1. The flow of people 
will be larger if the shift occurs in the sector of lower employment. 
The sector or local employment rates will increase in both sectors: 
[L
2
(W
2
)/ L
_
2
]/a = L
2
(W
2
) (- L
_
2
/ a)  /  L
_
2
2
 =    (V.14) 
 = W
1
 [L
2
(W
2
) / L
_
2
] / {W
1
[L
1
(W
1
)+a] + W
2
L
2
(W
2
)} = (W
1
/W
2
)/ L
_
 
and  
{[L
1
(W
1
)+a]/ L
_
1
}/a = (W
2
 / W
1
) [L
2
(W
2
)/ L
_
2
]/a =   (V.15) 
 = W
2
 [L
2
(W
2
) / L
_
2
] / {W
1
[L
1
(W
1
)+a] + W
2
L
2
(W
2
)} = 1 / L
_
 
The increase in the (local) employment rate (decrease in local unemployment 
rate) will be larger in the sector of lower wage, regardless of the sector where the 
demand shift occurred. The effect on the employment rate of the sector where the 
shift occurred will be larger, the smaller is total supply.  
Unemployment will decrease in region 2. In region 1: 
U
1
/a = L
_
1
/a - 1 = {W
1
 L
_
2
 - W
1
[L
1
(W
1
)+a] - W
2 
L
2
(W
2
)} / (V.16) 
 / {W
1
[L
1
(W
1
)+a] + W
2
L
2
(W
2
)}  
This will be negative iff: 
[L
1
(W
1
)+a] /  L
_
1
   >   L
_
2
 / L
_
      (V.17) 
2. Suppose we want to consider a simultaneous shift in the demand of both 
sectors. The equilibrium can be stated as: 
W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
) + c] / L
_
1
 = W
2
 [L
2
(W
2
) + c] /  L
_
2
   (V.18) 
and a change in c originates: 
L
_
1
/c = - L
_
2
/c =       (V.19)  
 = (W
1
L
_
2
 - W
2
L
_
1
) / {W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
)+c]  + W
2
 [L
2
(W
2
)+c]} 
Supply in sector 1 will increase with an increase in demand iff 
W
1
 / W
2
  >  L
_
1
 / L
_
2
       (V.20)   
Using the equilibrium condition (V.18), this means: 
L
2
(W
2
) + c  >  L
1
(W
1
) + c       (V.21) 
i.e., local supply increases in the sector of lower (absolute) employment. 
Looking at the employment rate: 
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{[L
1
(W
1
) + c] / L
_
1
}/c = {L
_
1
 - [L
1
(W
1
) + c] L
_
1
/c}/ L
_
1
2
 =  (V.22) 
= W
2
 [L
1
(W
1
)/ L
_
1
 + L
2
(W
2
)/ L
_
2
] / {W
1
[L
1
(W
1
)+c] + W
2
[L
2
(W
2
)+c] } = 
 =  (W
2
/W
1
 + 1) / L
_
 
and 
{[L
2
(W
2
) + c] / L
_
2
}/c =       (V.23) 
= W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
)/ L
_
1
 + L
2
(W
2
)/ L
_
2
] / {W
1
[L
1
(W
1
)+c] + W
2
[L
2
(W
2
)+c] } = 
 =  (W
1
/W
2
 + 1) / L
_
 
Therefore, the impact on the local unemployment rate will be negative and 
larger (in absolute value) in the sector of lower wage (lower local unemployment 
rate). 
The expected wage (in both sectors) increases with c according to: 
{W
2
[L
2
(W
2
) + c] / L
_
2
}/c = {W
1
[L
1
(W
1
) + c] / L
_
1
}/c =  (V.24) 
= W
1 
W
2
 [L
1
(W
1
)/ L
_
1
 + L
2
(W
2
)/ L
_
2
] /{W
1
[L
1
(W
1
)+c] + W
2
[L
2
(W
2
)+c]} = 
 = (W
1
 + W
2
) / L
_
 
As for local unemployment: 
U
1
/c = L
_
1
/c-1 = {W
1
L
_
2
-W
2
L
_
1
-W
1
[L
1
(W
1
)+c]-W
2
[L
2
(W
2
)+c]}/ (V.25) 
 / {W
1
[L
1
(W
1
)+c] + W
2
[L
2
(W
2
)+c]}  
This will be negative iff: 
[L
2
(W
2
)+c]/ L
_
 < [L
1
(W
1
)+c]/L
_
 + {[L
1
(W
1
)+c]/L
_
1
}{[L
2
(W
2
)+c]/ L
_
2
} (V.26) 
or 
L
_
2
 / L
_
 < {[L
1
(W
1
)+c]/[L
2
(W
2
)+c]} L
_
2
/ L
_
 +[L
1
(W
1
)+c]/ L
_
1
  (V.27) 
A sufficient condition for this to hold is that: 
L
_
2
/ L
_
 < [L
1
(W
1
)+c] / L
_
1
      (V.28) 
 
Proposition 9:  
9.1. An increase in the demand of one of the two sectors will increase the 
supply in that sector and decrease the supply of the other sector. Equilibrium 
expected wage will increase. The flow of people will be larger if the shift occurs in 
the sector of lower employment. The effect on the employment rate of the sector 
where the shift occurred will be larger, the smaller is total supply. 
9.2. An increase in demand in both sectors increases the supply of the sector 
where employment is lower. 
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9.3. (Local) unemployment rate fluctuations will be higher in the low wage (low 
local unemployment rate) region/sector. 
 
5.5. Global Coverage 
1. Take now the case where W
1
 = W
2
 = W, i.e., we have global, total or 
complete coverage. Equilibrium condition (V.5) becomes: 
L
1
(W) / L
_
1
 = L
2
(W) /  L
_
2
       (V.29)  
(V.29) establishes equality between employment - hence, also local 
unemployment - rates of the two sectors or regions. 
Notice that a change in W implies a double wage increase: in sector 1 and in 
sector 2. A change in the wage rate will imply: 
L
_
1
/W = - L
_
2
/W = [L
1
(W)' L
_
2
 - L
2
(W)' L
_
1
] /   (V.30) 
 / [L
1
(W) + L
2
(W)] 
Then, the labor force will flow to region 1 with a rise in W iff: 
L
1
(W)' /  L
_
1
 > L
2
(W)' / L
_
2
       (V.31) 
or 
1
 (1 - u
1
2
 (1 - u
2
)      (V.32) 
As u
1
 = u
2
, this means:  
1
  
2
 
1
 
2
 |     (V.33) 
Unemployment rate in region 1 will move according to: 
U
1
 /W = - [L
1
(W)' {L
1
(W) - [L
_
2
 - L
2
(W)]} + L
2
(W)' L
_
1
] /  (V.34) 
 / [L
1
(W) + L
2
(W)] 
It is a sufficient condition for this to be positive that: 
L
1
(W)   >   U
2
        (V.35) 
or 
L
1
(W)  +  L
2
(W)  >  L
_
2
       (V.36) 
Of course, the wage bill will increase in region i iff elasticity of demand in that 
region is smaller than 1 in absolute value. The total wage bill will increase iff: 
L
1
  
1
) + L
2
 
2
) >  0     (V.37) 
The employment rate will decrease (the local unemployment rate will increase) 
in region 1 (i.e., in both regions...): 
[L
1
(W)/ L
_
1
] / W = L
1
(W) [L
1
(W)' + L
2
(W)'] /   (V.38) 
 / { L
_
1
 [L
1
(W) + L
2
(W)]}  < 0 
The expected wage will increase iff: 
L
1
(W)/ L
_
1
 > - W  [L
1
(W)/ L
_
1
] / W     (V.39) 
Developing this condition, we can arrive at: 
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1
 + 1) L
1
 
2
 + 1) L
2
 > 0         (V.40) 
That, is the same condition as for total wage bill to increase. 
 
Proposition 10: With total coverage, the increase of the wage:  
- increases the unemployment rates in both sectors 
- 
i
 is lower in absolute value. As 
usual, it will increase the wage bill in each sector iff the elasticity of labor demand 
of the sector is smaller than 1 (in absolute value). It will increase the expected 
wage in the economy (and total wage bill) if both elasticities of labor demand are 
smaller than 1 (in absolute value). 
2. Parametric changes in supply or demand will yield very similar results as the 
ones seen for multiple coverage: 
Consider first a change in labor supply. Then (V.11) becomes: 
L
_
i
 / L
_
 = L
i
(W) / [L
1
(W) + L
2
(W)]  >  0    (V.41) 
With respect to shifts in demand, (V.13) turns into: 
L
_
1
/a = - L
_
2
/ a = L
_
2
 / {[L
1
(W)+a] + L
2
(W)} > 0  (V.42) 
and a general demand increase implies, from (V.19) and (V.20): 
L
_
1
 / c = - L
_
2
 / c =       (V.43) 
 = (L
_
2
 - L
_
1
) / {[L
1
(W) + c]  + [L
2
(W) + c]} 
Supply in sector 1 will increase with an increase in demand iff 
L
_
2
 >  L
_
1
    or   L
2
 > L
1
       (V.44)  
that is, supply increases in the sector with smaller local supply, therefore, 
smaller employment. 
 
6. Size Restrictions in the Sectors 
In this section we want to quantify the effects of several changes in the two-
sector model with institutional wage fixed in sector 1 but with size restriction in the 
areas.  
We consider the common assumptions 1. to 4. of the previous sections and 6.:  
6. Job rotation is only locally accomplished, i.e., individuals in one sector 
cannot get an employment in the second sector. 
We distinguish two cases: 
Model A: 
Region 1 has a limited housing capacity, or there are barriers to membership or 
affiliation in region 1 (say, "insiders" limit entry). We add assumption: 
5. Wage in second sector is market determined and entry location restrictions in 
region 1 place an upper bound of L
_
1
*
 on the amount of people that can actually live 
there. 
If the restriction is binding in equilibrium, supply in the second sector will be: 
L
_
2
  =  L
_
 -  L
_
1
*
       (VI.1) 
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and the wage in the second sector: 
W
2
 = W
2
(L
_
 - L
_
1
*
)       (VI.2) 
It must be the case that L
_
1
*
 is smaller than the equilibrium local supply in the 
institutional sector generated in the Harris-Todaro framework. As long as that 
condition holds, dynamics of this scenario have some of the same properties of the 
partial coverage - perfect mobility case. 
It is straightforward to show that: 
Proposition 11:  
11.1. In a dualistic model with housing or membership restrictions and 
institutional wage fixed in one of the sectors, the equilibrium wage in the 
uncovered sector is higher than the perfect mobility case. There will be 
unemployment but less than in the H.-T. framework. 
11.2. An increase in the size of the covered sector will: 
- decrease employment and increase the wage of the uncovered sector 
- increase the wage bill in the uncovered sector iff demand elasticity in that 
sector is smaller than 1 in absolute value. 
- have no effect on covered sector's employment or wage bill, but it will rise 
local and total unemployment and unemployment rate. 
11.3. An increase of the wage of the covered sector will have no impact  on 
employment of the other sector and will decrease employment in the first sector. It 
will rise the wage bill iff demand elasticity in the covered sector is smaller than 1 
in absolute value. 
11.4. An increase in total supply will have the same effects as in the perfect 
mobility case. 
11.5. An increase of either or both demands will always increase the total wage 
bill. It will always rise the wage bill in the sector where the shift occurred. 
11.6. If the (outward) demand shift is unilateral, employment will increase in 
the covered sector if the shift occurred in that sector. Employment will not change 
if the shift occurred in the uncoveredsector, where the wage bill will rise. 
11.7. If we have a general (outward) demand increase, employment of the 
covered sector will rise and the employment in the other will not change. The wage 
in the uncovered sector will rise. 
Notice that we could consider that the limitations occurred in the second sector, 
say, locals could not exceed L
_
2
*
, being L
_
2
*
 larger than employment in the uncovered 
sector in the H.-T. solution. All the above implications would be valid apart from 
11.2., which would hold for a "decrease in the size of the uncovered sector". 
Model B:  
The traditional sector has a limited ability of employment generation, say land 
(and land productivity) is fixed or limited; or there are employment quotas in the 
region. We consider assumption 5: 
5. Wage in second sector is demand determined but there is a(n exogenous) 
limit of access to employment in the sector given by L
2
*
. 
Then, the wage in the second sector is determined by: 
L
2
*
  =  L
2
(W
2
)        or  W
2
 = W
2
(L
2
*
)    (VI.3) 
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In this setting, there will be unemployment in both regions and everything 
works as in the Bhagwati-Hamada model. Changes in L
2
*
 have similar effect as 
changes in W
2
 multiplied by the slope of the demand in the second sector - and, 
thus, symmetric to the impact of a change in W
2
: 
dL
2
*
 = L
2
(W
2
)' dW
2
  or dW
2
  =  W
2
(L
2
*
)' dL
2
*
   (VI.4) 
If employment in sector 2 is fixed, we have the situation where the wage bill is 
also fixed in that sector. Therefore shifts of the wage of the covered sector, of total 
supply or of the demand of the first sector will have the same effects as in B.-H. 
Shifts in demand of the second sector will have different implications according 
to the way we introduce them.  
If we consider that a shift in the demand of the second sector implies a 
corresponding increase in the employment of the second sector but no change in 
productivity, i.e., the equilibrium condition can be stated as: 
W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
) + a] / L
_
1
 = (L
2
*
 + b) W
2
(L
2
*
) / L
_
2 
   (VI.5) 
we have the same conclusions as previously in the B.-H. model. 
If we consider that the changes affect productivity in the second sector but not 
the size capacity or employment limitations of that sector, we can write the 
equilibrium condition as: 
W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
) + a] / L
_
1
 =  W
2
(L
2
*
 - b) L
2
*
 / L
_
2
     (VI.6) 
1. Consider then that a is 0 and a change in b. The wage in the second sector 
increases with b. As for local supplies: 
L
_
2
/b   =  - L
_
1
/ b  =  -  L
2
*
 W
2
(L
2
*
 - b)' L
_
1
 /    (VI.7) 
 / {W
1
 L
1
(W
1
) + W
2
(L
2
*
 - b) L
2
*
 }  >  0 
The wage bill increases with b, as well as the expected wage in the economy. 
The sector or local employment rate will increase in sector 1 because W
1
 is 
fixed and expected wage increases; it will decrease in sector 2, because 
employment is fixed and L
_
2
 increases with b. 
2. Suppose we want to consider a simultaneous shift in the demand of both 
sectors. The equilibrium can be stated as: 
W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
) + c] / L
_
1
 =  W
2
(L
2
*
 - c)  L
2
*
 /  L
_
2 
    (VI.8) 
and a change in c originates: 
L
_
1
/c = - L
_
2
/c =  [W
1
 L
_
2
 + W
2
(L
2
*
 - c) L
2
*
 L
_
1
] /    (VI.9) 
 / {W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
)+c]  + W
2
(L
2
*
  - c)  L
2
*
} 
Supply in sector 1 will increase with an increase in demand iff 
W
1
 /  [-W
2
(L
2
*
 - c)' L
2
*
]  >  L
_
1
 / L
_
2
      (VI.10)   
Using the equilibrium condition (VI.8), this means: 
W
2
(L
2
*
 - c) / [-W
2
(L
2
*
 - c)' L
2
* 2
 |  >  [L
1
(W
1
) + c ] / L
2
*
  (VI.11) 
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i.e., local supply increases in sector 1 iff elasticity of demand in that sector is 
larger than the employment share of the other sector relative to the second sector. 
Wage in the uncovered sector, expected wage in both regions (and total wage 
bill) will always increase with c. Therefore, as W
1
 is fixed, the unemployment rate 
in the covered sector will decrease with c. As for sector 2: 
(L
2
*
 / L
_
2
)/c  =  -  L (L
_
2
/c)/ L
_
2
2
      (VI.12) 
The unemployment rate in sector 2 will move in the same direction of local 
supply, as well as total unemployment in region 2. As for unemployment in region 
1: 
U
1
/c  =  L
_
1
/c  - 1  =  {W
1
 L
_
2
 + W
2
(L
2
*
 - c)' L
2
*
 / L
_
1
 –  (VI.13) 
 -  W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
)+c]  - W
2
(L
2
*
 - c)  L
2
*
} /  
 / {W
1
 [L
1
(W
1
)+c]  + W
2
(L
2
*
 - c)  L
2
*
} 
This will be negative iff: 
2
 |  {1 -  (L
_
 /L
_
2
) [L
1
(W
1
)+c] / L
_
1
} < [L
1
(W
1
)+c] / [L
2
(W
2
)+c]   (VI.14) 
It is a sufficient condition for the expression to hold that: 
L
_
2
 / L
_
  <  [L
1
(W
1
)+c] / L
_
1
       (VI.15) 
Proposition 12:  
12.1. With this scenario, the increase in the covered sector's wage, of labor 
supply or of the demand of the covered sector has the same effects as in the B.-H. 
framework. The same occurs if the demand shifter in the uncovered sector works 
through employment but not productivity and we consider the different demand 
shift combinations. 
12.2. The increase in the employment restriction in sector 2 
- increases the wage bill 
- increases supply in that sector (and decreases the supply in the other sector) 
- increases the equilibrium expected wage iff the wage-elasticity of labor 
demand of the sector in which the wage increase was registered is larger than 1 (in 
absolute value). The reverse would happen if such elasticity was smaller than 1. 
Local unemployment rate in the second region will necessarily decrease. 
12.3. If we consider that the demand shift in the uncovered sector affects 
productivity but not employment: 
- An increase in the demand of the uncovered or of the two sectors will increase 
the wage in the uncovered sector, total wage bill and the expected wage in the 
economy and decrease the unemployment rate in the covered sector. 
- An increase in demand in both sectors increases the supply of the covered 
sector, and thus, the corresponding local unemployment and unemployment rate iff 
elasticity of demand in that sector is higher (in absolute value) of the ration of 
sector 1 to sector 2's employment. 
- An unilateral increase in the demand of the uncovered sector will increase 
local supply in the uncovered sector, where unemployment rate will increase. 
 
7. Further Applications: Comparison of Effects Across 
Different Scenarios 
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. A possible application of the complete analysis is the comparison of the 
comparative static results across different scenarios.  
1. Consider the effect on the expected wage - and, in this framework, on output 
and per capita output - of the economy of an exogenous increase in demand - 
change in  a, b, c. Let: 
We/jF.-M. = (a) ( Free market) 
We/jP.-M. = (b) (Perfect mobility) 
We/jH.-T. = (c) (Harris-Todaro) 
We/jB.-H. = (d) (Bhagwati-Hamada) 
 j = a, b, c. Then one can show that around the free market solution, i.e., W
1
 = 
W
2
, u
1
 = u
2
 = 0: 
2
 
1
 | > 1,  then (b) < (a) < (c) < (d). The effects of the business 
cycle increases as institutional arrangements or mobility restrictions are imposed; 
free market would exhibit a low depth of the cycle. 
2
 
1
 | < 1,  then (d) < (c) < (a) < (b). The effects of the business 
cycle decreases as institutional arrangements or mobility restrictions are imposed; 
free market would exhibit a low depth of the cycle. 
1
 
2
 
1
 | L
1
/ L
_
1
 
2
 |  L
2
/ L
_
2
 < 1, (b) < (c) < (d) 
1
 | L
1
/ L
_
1
 
2
 |  L
2
/ L
_
2
 > 1, (b) < (c) < (a) < (d). The depth of the 
cycle is enlarged as institutional arrangements or mobility restrictions are imposed; 
but free market would exhibit a high degree depth of the cycle too. 
1
 
2
 
1
 | L
1
/ L
_
1
 
2
 |  L
2
/ L
_
2
 < 1, (d) < (a) < (c) 
1
 | L
1
/ L
_
1
 
2
 |  L
2
/ L
_
2
 > 1, (a) < (d) < (c) < (b).The depth of the 
cycle decreases as institutional arrangements or mobility restrictions are imposed; 
but free market would exhibit also a low depth of the cycle too. 
The same conclusions would hold for the effect (in absolute value) of an 
exogenous increase of the total population, L
_
 on the overall expected wage and on 
per capita output. 
One can see that, consistently, the (increasing or decreasing, depending on 
demand elasticities) trend always comes from (b) - one institutional sector with 
perfect mobility - to (c) - one institutional sector with no mobility - to (d) - both 
sectors are subject to institutional rules. However, free market results do not 
necessarily obey to a systematic comparison with the others. 
2. Also, with respect to the unemployment rate u, one can show that, around the 
free market solution it is always the case that: 
.  u/L
_
H.-T.
  <  u/L
_
B.-H.
   
.  | u/jH.-T. |  <  | u/jB.-H. |  ,   j = a,b,c 
That is the unemployment rate will suffer larger fluctuations when institutional 
arrangements are more widely spread. 
Proposition 13:  
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13.1. If the demand elasticity of the secondary sector is larger than 1 in absolute 
value, the output cycle is enlarged as we move from the scenario of one 
institutional sector with perfect mobility, to the model with one institutional sector 
with no mobility and, finally, to the case where both sectors are subject to 
institutional rules; if demand elasticity of the secondary sector is smaller than 1 in 
absolute value, the output cycle is dampened as we move in that direction. Free 
market results do not necessarily obey to a systematic comparison with the others. 
13.2. The same pattern is observed for induced movements of per capita output 
in response to changes in the exogenous labor supply. 
13.3. The overall unemployment rate will always show stronger fluctuations 
when both sectors are institutionally covered. 
 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
1. It is clear that migration/mobility decisions are based in differential wages in 
the several regions or sectors where wage setting is not competitive. The main 
contribution of this research is a unified formal treatment of the two-sector 
economy under different mobility and institutional conditions and the investigation 
of sensitivity to several shifts.  
The analysis starts from an exposition of results implied in a two sector model 
under free market. Then it follows for a two-sector model with one-covered sector 
but perfect mobility across sectors - which generates no unemployment. Next, it 
considers the Harris-Todaro model where one sector is competitive and imperfect 
mobility across regions is imposed; then goes to the two-sector institutionally ruled 
framework of Bhagwati-Hamada; and finally describes a (two) possible 
equilibrium (equilibria) where there are size restrictions, either in the region or 
affiliation possibilities (for example, migration quotas), or in the employment 
generation capacity of the traditional sector. 
2. Several conclusions can be drawn with the simple models used - the results 
are summarized in Tables 1 to 6. The most interesting ones are on the direction of 
the migration/mobility flow - local or sector supply, or people that rotate in a sector 
- and also on average (and/or expected) wage outcomes in response to a change in 
the wage, exogenous supply or demands.  
The sign effects of supply and unilateral demand shifts on each macroeconomic 
aggregate seem invariant to the dualistic scenario considered. All other changes in 
exogenous conditions may have different sign effects on some of the aggregates 
according to the framework chosen. 
Some conclusions depend upon the size of demand elasticities; others on 
relative expected wage in the two regions; and still others on the employment size 
of the two regions. In general,  
- a low demand elasticity of a region where a wage increase takes place favors 
both regions average wage. 
- a shift in supply will rise (more) local unemployment in the region of higher 
wage bill - or higher employment. 
3. With respect to local or sector unemployment rate fluctuations induced by 
demand shifts (the business cycle), they seem to be higher in the low(er) wage 
sector (or lower unemployment rate sector) when we are in presence of multiple 
coverage (and or global coverage).  
4. The output cycle is enlarged or dampened (depending on demand elasticities 
of the secondary sector being large or small) as we move from the scenario of one 
institutional sector with perfect mobility, to the model with one institutional sector 
with no mobility and, finally, to the case where both sectors are subject to 
institutional rules. Free market results do not necessarily obey to a systematic 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 1(2), A. P. Martins. p.150-185. 
177 
177 
comparison with the others. The same is observed for induced movements of per 
capita output in response to changes in the exogenous labor supply. 
The overall unemployment rate will always show stronger fluctuations when 
both sectors are institutionally covered. 
5. Size restrictions or local population quotas may work as policy devices to 
counteract the effects of (other) institutional arrangements. In general, affiliation 
restrictions in the institutional sector of a Harris-Todaro framework originate 
macroeconomic behavior patterns similar to perfect mobility with partial (or one-
sector) coverage. Employment sluggishness of the traditional sector originates 
comparative statics results which are similar to those of the Bhagwati-Hamada 
model. 
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TABLE 1. Institutional Wage Increases (or of Wage in Sector 1) 
 Model 
Variable P.-M. H.-T. B.-H. B.-H.TC A B 
L
1
  - - - - - - 
W
1
 L
1
  +  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
L
_
1
  
- +  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 2
| 
.. +  iff 
1 
| < 1 
W
1
 L
1
 / L
_
1
  
+ +  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff  
L
1
1
)+L
2
2
)>0 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
U
1
  . +  if 
1 
| < 1 
or W
2
 = W
1
 
1
|<1 or 
L
_
2
/L
_
<L
1
/L
_
1
 
+  if 
L
1
 > U
2
 
+ 1
|<1 or 
L
_
2
/L
_
<L
1
/L
_
1
 
u
1
  . + + + + + 
W
2
  - +  iff 
1 
| < 1 
.. + 0 0 
L
2
  + -  iff 
1 
| < 1 
0 - 0 .. 
W
2
 L
2
  +  iff 
2 
| > 1 
i
| -1 
of same sign 
0 +  iff 
2 
| < 1 
0 0 
L
_
2
  
+ -  iff 
1 
| < 1 
-  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
2 1
| 
0 -  iff 
1 
| < 1 
 
W
2
 L
2
 / L
_
2
  
- +  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff  
L
1
1
)+ 
L
2
2
)>0 
0 +  iff 
1 
| < 1 
U
2
  . . -  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  if 
L
2
 > U
1
 
. -  iff 
1 
| < 1 
u
2
  . . -  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+ . -  iff 
1 
| < 1 
 
W
1
 L
1
 + W
2
 L
2
  
+  iff  
W
1
1 1
< W
2
2 2
 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff  
L
1
1
)+L
2
2
)>0 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
+  iff 
1 
| < 1 
U  . +  if 
1 
| < 1 
or W
2
 = W
1
 
+ + + + 
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TABLE 2. Size Restrictions 
 
 Model 
Variable A B 
Effects on Sector 1   
L
1
  0 0 
W
1
 L
1
  0 0 
L
_
1
  
+ 2 
| < 1 
W
1
 L
1
 / L
_
1
  
- 2 
| > 1 
U
1
  + 2 
| < 1 
u
1
  + 2 
| < 1 
Effects on Sector 2   
W
2
  + - 
L
2
  - + 
W
2
 L
2
  2 
| < 1 
2 
| > 1 
L
_
2
  
- 2 
| > 1 
W
2
 L
2
 / L
_
2
  
+ 2 
| > 1 
U
2
  . 
-   
2 
| < 1  or  L
_
1
/L
_
 < L
2
/L
_
2
 
u
2
  . - 
Total Effects   
W
1
 L
1
 + W
2
 L
2
  2 
| < 1 
2 
| > 1 
U  + - 
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TABLE 3. Supply Shifts 
 Model 
Variable F.-M. P.-M. H.-T. B.-H. A B 
W
1
  - .. .. .. .. .. 
L
1
  + 0 0 0 0 0 
W
1
 L
1
  +  iff 
1 
| > 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
L
_
1
  
+ 0 + + .. + 
W
1
 L
1
 / L
_
1
  
- 0 0 - 0 - 
U
1
  . . + + 0 + 
u
1
  . . + + 0 + 
W
2
  - - - .. - 0 
L
2
  + + + 0 + .. 
W
2
 L
2
  +  iff 
2 
| > 1 
+  iff 
2 
| > 1 
+  iff 
2 
| > 1 
0 +  iff 
2 
| > 1 
0 
L
_
2
  
+ + + + + + 
W
2
 L
2
 / L
_
2
  
- - - - - - 
U
2
  . . . + . + 
u
2
  . . . + . + 
 
W
1
 L
1
 + W
2
 L
2
  
+  iff  
L
1
1
)+ L
2
2
)<0 
+  iff 
2 
| > 1 
+  iff 
2 
| > 1 
0 +  iff 
2 
| > 1 
0 
(W
1
L
1
+ W
2
L
2
) / L
_
 
- - - - - - 
U . . + + 0 + 
u  . . +  if 
2 
| < 1 
+ 0 + 
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TABLE 4. Demand Shifts in Covered Sector or Sector 1 
 Model 
Variable F.-M. P.-M. H.-T. B.-H. A B 
W
1
 + .. .. .. .. .. 
L
1
 + + + + + + 
W
1
 L
1
 + + + + + + 
L
_
1
 
+ + + + .. + 
W
1
 L
1
 / L
_
1
 
+ 0 + + + + 
U
1
 . . -  if 
2
|<L1/L2 
or W
2
 = W
1
 
-  iff 
L
_
2
/L
_
<L
1
/L
_
1
 
- -  iff 
L
_
2
/L
_
<L
1
/L
_
1
 
u
1
 . . - - - - 
W
2
 + + + .. 0 0 
L
2
 - - - 0 0 .. 
W
2
 L
2
 +  iff 
2 
| < 1 
+  iff 
2 
| < 1 
+  iff 
2 
| < 1 
0 0 0 
L
_
2
 
- - - - 0 - 
W
2
 L
2
 / L
_
2
 
+ + + + 0 + 
U
2
 . . . - . - 
u
2
 . . . - . - 
W
1
 L
1
 + W
2
 L
2
 + + + + + + 
U . . -  if 
2
|<L1/L2 
or W
2
 = W
1
 
- - - 
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TABLE 5. Demand Shifts in Uncovered Sector or Sector 2 
 
 Model 
Variable F.-M. P.-M. H.-T. B.-H. A B1 B2 
W
1
  + .. .. .. .. .. .. 
L
1
  - 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W
1
 L
1
  +  iff 
1 
| < 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
L
_
1
  
- 0 - - .. - - 
W
1
 L
1
 / L
_
1
  
+ 0 + + 0 + + 
U
1
  . . - - 0 - - 
u
1
  . . - - 0 - - 
W
2
  + + + .. + .. + 
L
2
  + 0 + + 0 + .. 
W
2
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2
  + + + + + + + 
L
_
2
  
+ 0 + + 0 + + 
W
2
 L
2
 / L
_
2
  
+ + + + + + + 
U
2
  . . . -  iff 
L
_
1
/L
_
<L
2
/L
_
2
 
. -  iff 
L
_
1
/L
_
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2
/L
_
2
 
+ 
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2
  . . . - . - + 
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1
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1
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2
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2
  + + + + + + + 
U  . . - - 0 - 0 
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TABLE 6.  Demand Shifts in Both Sectors 
 
 Model 
Variable F.-M. P.-M. H.-T. B.-H. A B1 B2 
W
1
  + .. .. .. .. .. .. 
L
1
  +  iff 
L
2
' < L
1
' 
+ + + + + + 
W
1
 L
1
  +  if 
1 
| < 2 
+ + + + + + 
L
_
1
  
+  iff 
L
2
' < L
1
' 
+ +  iff 
2
|>L1/L2 
+  iff 
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.. +  iff 
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2
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W
1
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1
 / L
_
1
  
+ 0 + + + + + 
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2
|<2 L1/L2 
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2
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2
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1
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_
1
 
- -  if 
L
_
2
/L
_
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| < 2 
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+ + + + 
L
_
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+  iff 
L
1
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2
' 
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2
|<L1/L2 
+  iff 
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0 +  iff 
L2 < L1 
+  iff 
2
|<L1/L2 
W
2
 L
2
 / L
_
2
  
+ + + + + + + 
U
2
  . . . -  if 
L
_
1
/L
_
<L
2
/L
_
2
 
. -  if 
L
_
1
/L
_
<L
2
/L
_
2
 
+  iff 
2
|<L1/L2 
u
2
  . . . - . - +  iff 
2
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1
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  + + + + + + + 
U  . . -  if 
2
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1
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Notes 
 
i A good survey of theoretical literature can be found in Bhattacharya (1993).  
ii See McNabb and Ryan (1990) for a recent survey. Literature on segmented labor markets seems to have followed 
an independent path of international economics. See also Saint-Paul (1996) for applications of the theory with 
microfoundations for several dualistic structures. 
iii See for example, Mincer (1976) and McDonald and Solow (1985).  
iv See Robinson (1988). 
v See, for example, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974), Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1975), Todaro (1976).  
vi The recent rise of Institutional Economics, specially in Europe, may be associated to fact that in the Old Continent 
market forces seem to work in a different, more rigid, context. Nevertheless, those forces (may) still work... 
vii These were considered in enlarged versions of Harris-Todaro type by Fields (1989), for example.  
viii McDonald and Solow (1985) also analyze this issue in a two-sector economy where primary wages are formed 
under collective bargaining and the secondary market is competitive. We discard the problem of how the primary 
sector jobs are determined... 
ix See Fields (1989), for example, for a similar definition of demand shifter, but interpreted there as government 
induced. 
x Equation (2) in Corden and Findlay (1975). 
xi See, for example, Corden and Findlay (1975) or Krueger (1983) for a similar graph. 
xii See Fields (1989), for example, for a similar definition of demand shifter, but interpreted there as government 
induced. 
xiii We reproduce the same - and not the symmetric - effect of emigration of skilled labor found in Hamada and 
Bhagwati (1983). This is due to different assumptions. 
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